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WORK OF THE SUPREME COURT
III. Procedure
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
Dale E. Bennett*
VoIR DIRE EXAMINATION OF JURORS
Article 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure recognizes a
ground for challenge for cause by the prosecution "That the juror
tendered in a capital case has conscientious scruples against the
infliction of capital punishment."' As a corollary of that rule, a
juror who will impose only the death penalty is subject to chal-
lenge for cause by the defense. In brief, jurors must be free of
any conscientious scruples which would prevent either a capital
or a qualified verdict. In the Henry cases2 the proper method of
eliciting such information is clearly stated. The questions must
be phrased "could you" and not "would you" render a capital
verdict, or a qualified verdict, as the case may be. This form of
questioning does not commit the juror in advance as to how he
will exercise a strictly discretionary power, which "is analogous
to the commuting power of the governor." In State v. Sanford3
the proposed question of defense counsel concluded-"In the
event that you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the
guilt of this accused, is a verdict carrying with it the death pen-
alty the only verdict that you could return, or could you bring
in a verdict of guilty without capital punishment?" When the
trial judge sustained the state's objection to this question, defense
counsel took a bill of exception without making any effort to
rephrase the question.
The question propounded had followed the approved "could
you" form, but the trial judge felt confusion resulted by reason
of uncertainty as to what was meant by "guilt of the accused."
While the supreme court may not have entirely subscribed to the
trial judge's belief that the propounded question was unduly
confusing, it felt that the defense counsel should have made
some effort to rephrase the question along simpler lines. In
affirming the conviction, the supreme court stressed the trial
judge's per curiam observation that his ruling was leveled at the
form in which the question was propounded rather than to its
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. La. R.S. (1950) 15:352(2).
2. 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940); and 197 La. 999, 3 So. 2d 104 (1941).
3. 218 La. 38, 48 So. 2d 272 (1950).
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substance,. and that the right to interrogate the prospective
jurors concerning their attitude toward the qualified verdict
had never been denied. The Sanford decision serves notice on
defense attorneys that they must make an effort to satisfy the
trial judge's requirements of simplicity and clarity, rather than
to stand upon the technical legality of specific questions asked.
In State v. Wideman 4 several bills of exceptions were leveled
at rulings of the trial judge upon the voir dire examination of
jurors. The most significant were incidental to the examination
of a prospective juror who was a brother of the deputy sheriff
listed as a witness for the state. First, the supreme court held
that the trial judge had properly overruled a question of whether
this juror would believe his brother's testimony, rather than the
testimony of defendants and their witnesses. This ruling came
within the well-settled principle that it is the purpose of the voir
dire examination to ascertain the qualifications of the juror for
the trial of the case, and not to determine his attitude toward a
particular witness who is expected to testify. In so holding, the
supreme court pointed out that the relationship contemplated by
Article 351 was specifically limited to that existing between the
juror and the accused or the person injured. While relationship
with a state's witness might, under certain circumstances, result
in such partiality or prejudice as to prevent a fair trial, no such
showing had been made. "The right to permit challenge of a
juror for cause on any ground other than those set out in Article
351," declared Chief Justice Fournet, "is within the sound dis-
cretion of the trial judge, which will not be disturbed unless it is
shown he abused that discretion. . . ." 5
SEPARATION OF JURORS
From the moment of acceptance until the rendition of their
verdict, jurors in a capital case "shall be kept together under the
charge of an officer in such a way as to be secluded from all out-
side communication." 6 The sacramental character of this require-
ment is forcefully illustrated by State v. Walters,7 a protracted
trial for kidnapping, where improper separation was found by the
distribution of the jurors in three adjoining but clearly separated
suites of hotel rooms. It did not preclude reversal that the
4. 218 La. 860, 51 So. 2d 96 (1951).
5. 218 La. 860, 866, 51 So. 2d 96, 98 (1950).
6. Art. 394, La. Crim. Code of 1942; La. R.S. (1950) 15:394.
7. 135 La. 1070, 66 So. 364 (1914).
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entrances to all rooms were in the sight and hearing of a deputy
sheriff who slept in the hall in front of the rooms, and that the
evidence of the case revealed no possibility of outside communi-
cation with the jurors. Subsequent cases have shown a somewhat
more liberal tendency, upholding the verdict where jurors were
taken to a picture show by the deputies in charge," and where
the jurors were temporarily separated, but with both groups
under immediate supervision."
In non-capital cases, the trial judge is expressly authorized
to permit separation of the jurors at any time prior to his charge
to the jury.10 Where the temporary separation of the jury is not
judicially authorized, error is committed; but the situation is
governed by the general rule that a trial irregularity is not ground
for reversal unless substantial prejudice is shown to have re-
sulted." In State v. Fuller 2 the jury of a non-capital case had
been taken to a crowded restaurant where it became necessary to
seat two jurors at a separate table with third persons. This sep-
aration of the jurors had not been authorized. However, testimony
on a motion for a new trial revealed positively that there was no
misconduct on the part of the two jurors, who made no reference
to the case in conversing with their table companions. In over-
ruling defense counsel's motion for a new trial, the supreme court
stressed the fact that the defense had failed to establish its claim
of prejudice and injury.
It should be noted that proof of actual prejudice is usually
almost impossible, for the juror who is tampered with will seldom
admit of the transgression. The requirement of jury isolation is
to avoid any possibility of such an occurrence. The Fuller case is
probably correct in holding that prejudice must specifically be
shown in a judicially unauthorized separation of the jury prior
to the charge in a non-capital case. However, an unsupervised
separation in a capital case, or after charge in a non-capital case,
presents a much more serious situation. Here, the intent of the
statutory requirement is so clear and the danger so evident, that
prejudice will probably be presumed from the act of violation.
8. State v. Clary, 136 La. 589, 67 So. 376 (1915); State v. Ledet, 211 La. 769,
30 So. 2d 830 (1947), discussed in 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEw 298 (1948).
9. State v. Dowdy, 217 La. 773, 47 So. 2d 496 (1950), where part of the
selected jurors remained in the jury box, and part were taken to an adjoining
room and there kept in the custody of the sheriff.
10. Art. 394, La. Crim. Code of 1942.
11. Art. 557, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. (1950) 15:557.
12. 218 La. 872, 51 So. 2d 305 (1951), noted in 25 Tulane L. Rev. 511 (1951).
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PRESENCE OF ACCUSED DURING TRIAL
It is a well-settled rule in felony cases that the accused must
be present at every stage of the trial from arraignment to sen-
tence, and the burden is on the state to see that the minutes of the
court show such presence.'3 Where the defendant has been actu-
ally present, but such presence is not shown in the court minutes,
the case may be remanded to permit the state to prove that the
accused was present and to have the court minutes amended
accordingly. 14 In State v. Benoit 1" the defendant, who had been
convicted of negligent homicide, argued that the court minutes
failed to show his presence at every important stage of the trial.
The supreme court pointed out that since the minutes specif-
ically showed that the accused was present at the beginning of
the trial and the trial was a continuous transaction without inter-
ruption, that would constitute a sufficient general showing of
defendant's presence during the entire trial. It is so well settled
that citation of authorities would be superfluous, that in a short
continuous trial if the court minutes show the defendant's pres-
ence when the trial began, his presence will be presumed to have
continued until the termination of the trial. It would be most
inconvenient, as a practical matter, to require the making of a
minute entry showing the defendant's presence at each separate
stage of the trial. A further difficulty would lie in ascertaining
what would constitute a separate stage.
The appellant had been prompt in urging the further specific
objection that he was not present at the time the jury examined
the homicide car. In passing upon the trial judge's refusal to
grant a new trial on this ground, the supreme court recognized
the fact that the jury's visit to the car constituted a taking of
evidence, even though no witnesses testified at the scene.' 6 How-
ever, the court concluded that no reversible error had been com-
mitted. Justice Ponder stressed the facts that the defense counsel
had requested that the jury view the car, that the defendant's
absence was voluntary, and that the visit to the car was a rather
unimportant part of the proceedings since no witnesses testified
at the scene. This holding was in conformity with the trend of
Louisiana decisions to recognize a waiver of the right of the
accused to be present where (1) his absence was voluntary and
13. State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911).
14. State v. Pope, 214 La. 1026, 39 So. 2d 719 (1949).
15. 53 So. 2d 404 (La. 1951).
16. State v. O'Day, 188 La. 169, 175 So. 838 (1937).
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(2) no real prejudice is shown to have resulted. It is suggested
that if the trial had been for a capital crime the defendant's
absence, even under the mitigating circumstances of the Benoit
case, might well have constituted reversible error. In capital
cases it is generally held that the accused must be present during
all phases of the trial and cannot waive this right.17
HABITUAL OFFENDER PROCEEDINGS
The Louisiana Habitual Offender Law' s provides penalties
progressively more severe for cases in which a defendant con-
victed of a felony is found to have been previously convicted of
other felonies. The charge that the defendant is a prior offender
may be brought "at any time, either after conviction or sentence,"
and is frequently brought after the offender is already serving
his sentence.' 9 In such cases, if the offender is found to have
previous felony convictions on his record, the court resentences
him as a multiple offender, with credit given for time already
served under the original lighter sentence.
In State v. George"0 the offender had been convicted of theft
of $1460 and sentenced to one year in the parish prison. Shortly
after he completed his sentence and was released from the jail,
the district attorney filed an information charging five previous
felonies distributed among the states of Louisiana, Tennessee, and
Ohio, and ranging from automobile theft to burglary. After
determining the truth of these charges, the trial judge sentenced
the offender to the state penitentiary for life. Defense counsel's
unsuccessful motion to quash the information chafging the
offender as a habitual offender had been largely predicated upon
the contention that after the offender served his original sentence
and was discharged from jail the case was closed, and he could
no longer be charged with enhanced penalties as a multiple
offender. On appeal, the supreme court properly approached the
problem as one of statutory interpretation. Does our habitual
criminal statute require that the charge be brought prior to exe-
cution of the original sentence? No constitutional issue of double
jeopardy was involved. 21 If the legislature decides to impose
17. State v. Thomas, 128 La. 813, 55 So. 415 (1911), where the defendant's
failure to except at the time did not deprive him of the right to urge the
defect on appeal.
18. La. R.S. (1950) 15:529.1.
19. State v. Guidry, 169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929).
20. 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950).
21. See State v. Guidry, 169 La. 215, 124 So. 832 (1929).
1952]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
increased penalties upon offenders with a prior criminal record,
it may determine the time at which such proceedings must be
instituted. Controlling statutory language was found in the pro-
vision that the charge may be brought "at any time, either after
conviction or sentence" and that the offender shall thereupon be
brought before the court "whether confined in prison or other-
wise." The supreme court concluded that the legislature intended
to authorize the bringing of the charge even after the offender has
served the sentence imposed upon him as a first offender. The
proceeding, in such a case, is one to correct a sentence which
was insufficient in the light of facts (prior convictions) discovered
after it was imposed. New York, interpreting a similar provision,
had clearly upheld the legislature's power to authorize such a
procedure.22
SENTENCING--TWENTY-FOUR HOUR DELAY
Article 521 of the Code of Criminal Procedure23 requires that
"at least twenty-four hours shall elapse between conviction and
sentence, unless the accused waive the delay and ask for the impo-
sition of sentence at once." This mandatory delay provides a
brief period during which the defense may prepare and file
motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment-motions
which must be filed after conviction and before sentence.24 In
State v. George,25 the trial judge, after determining that the
defendant was an habitual offender 26 immediately sentenced him
to life imprisonment. Defense counsel's request for a twenty-four
hour delay in which to file additional pleadings was overruled.
In holding that no reversible error had been committed, the
supreme court followed the mandate of Article 557 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure27 that no judgment shall be set aside
unless it appears that the error complained of "has probably
resulted in a miscarriage of justice" or "is prejudicial to the sub-
stantial rights of the accused." It was significant that, after
imposing. sentence, the trial judge had granted defense counsel
additional time to file further pleadings, and had heard defen-
dant's motion in arrest of judgment which was fully considered
22. People v. Gowasky, 244 N.Y. 451, 459, 155 N.E. 737 (1927), cited 218
La. 18, 32, 48 So. 2d 265, 270 (1950).
23. La. R.S. (1950) 15:521.
24. La. R.S. (1950) 15:505 and 519.
25. 218 La. 18, 48 So. 2d 265 (1950).
26. La. R.S. (1950) 15:529.1.
27. La. R.S. (1950) 15:557,
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and overruled on its merits. Thus, "after an examination of the
entire record," as contemplated by Article 557, it did not appear
that the defendant's rights had been substantially affected by the
hasty imposition of sentence.
In view of its clear-cut disposition of the above issue, the
supreme court did not find it necessary to pass upon the state's
further query as to whether the twenty-four hour delay require-
ment is applicable to a person sentenced after being adjudged an
habitual criminal. It would seem that the purpose of the rule
applies equally to such a situation, and that a normal construc-
tion of the phrase "between conviction and sentence" would
include the habitual offender proceedings which are instigated
by information and are expressly referred to as a "trial." 28
BILLS OF ExCEPTIONS
Exceptions must be taken to trial judge's rulings objected to,
if such irregularities are to serve as the basis of an appeal. The
exception must specify the ground of objection to the trial judge's
ruling29 and must be incorporated in a formal bill of exceptions
prepared by defense counsel and signed by the trial judge.30 In
State v. Honeycutt3' the defendant had, for a second time, been
found guilty of aggravated rape. Defense counsel had excepted
and purported to reserve a bill of exceptions to the trial judge's
overruling a motion to quash the indictment because of alleged
racial discrimination by the jury commissioners and also to the
judge's admission of certain testimony. A motion for a new
trial, based upon the exceptions, had been overruled by the trial
judge and defense counsel appealed. In holding that a proper
basis for an appeal had not been established, the supreme court
stressed the fact that the bill of exceptions had never been per-
fected by being presented to the trial judge for his signature and
per curiam.32 Similarly, in State v. Roy, 83 the supreme court
refused to consider appellant's unsigned bills of exceptions. The
28. La. R.S. (1950) 15:529.1. As to the nature of the habitual offender pro-
ceedings as a regular criminal trial, see State v. Nejin, 140 La. 793, 74 So.
103 (1917).
29. State v. Ricks, 170 La. 507, 128 So. 293 (1930).
30. Art. 499, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S. (1950) 15:499.
31. 218 La. 362, 49 So. 2d 610 (1950).
32. Bills of exceptions must be presented to and signed by the trial judge
before appeal is taken. Arts. 542, 545, La. Code of Crim. Proc. of 1928; La. R.S.
(1950) 15:542, 545. "Unsigned bills copied in the transcript are in legal con-
templation no bills at all." State v. Chretian, 184 La. 739, 167 So. 426 (1936).
Accord: State v. McDonald, 218 La. 198, 48 So. 2d 797 (1950).
33. 217 La. 1074, 47 So. 2d 915 (1950).
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exceptions had been presented to the trial judge after the order
of appeal was granted, and he had appropriately refused to sign
them, since his jurisdiction over the case had terminated with
the granting of the appeal.
In the Honeycutt case a further reason that the issues raised
by defendant's exceptions could not be reviewed upon appeal was
the fact that the testimony adduced at the hearing of the motion
to quash had not been annexed to and made a part of the bill of
exceptions. Even though such testimony was found in the clerk's
transcript of the trial, it did not become a part of the official
record reviewable by the supreme court, except by being annexed
to and made a part of a bill of exceptions duly reserved.
NEw TRIAL AFTER CONVICTION OF LESSER OFFENSE
In State v. Crittenden the defendant was originally indicted
for manslaughter and found guilty of the then included lesser
crime of negligent homicide. This verdict had the dual effect of
finding the accused "not guilty of manslaughter" and "guilty of
negligent homicide." When the conviction was set aside and the
case remanded, the new trial was limited to the negligent homi-
cide charge of which he had been convicted.3 4 Upon a second
trial the defendant was again convicted of negligent homicide and
again appealed. The case has already been noted in this REVIEW, 33
but the two principal procedural issues raised in connection with
the second appeal36 will be briefly restated.
The first question related to the propriety of giving the jury
the original indictment, which was endorsed with the first jury's
"negligent homicide" finding. Appellant claimed that the jurors,
who carry the indictment with them to the jury room, would be
prejudiced by the knowledge that a prior jury had found the
defendant guilty of the crime now charged. The contention was
briefly, but distinctly, overruled. General approval of this pro-
cedure is predicated upon the assumption that such incidental
knowledge of the former conviction is of no serious consequence,
so long as the jury is properly instructed as to the true legal situ-
ation, that is, that they are to determine the issue of guilt entirely
de novo.
Second, the court held that the original indictment and
34. State v. Harville, 171 La. 256, 130 So. 348 (1930).
35. 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 464 (1951).
36. 218 La. 333, 49 So. 2d 418 (1950).
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arraignment for manslaughter could serve, at the second trial, as
a proper charge and arraignment for the lesser generic offense of
negligent homicide. Thus, it was not necessary to re-indict or to
re-arraign the defendant for that charge. In so holding the court
looked to the time when the indictment was found, the verdict
returned, and the new trial granted-all of which were prior to
the effective date of the 1948 responsive verdict statute3 which
eliminated negligent homicide as a responsive verdict to murder
and manslaughter charges. If the charge, verdict, and granting
of the new trial had been subsequent to the effective date of the
1948 statute, the filing of a new charge and a second arraignment
would have been required and it is entirely possible that a second
charge would have been subject to a former jeopardy plea.8
APPEAL-MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGMENTS
The Louisiana Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over
municipal court judgments is limited to those cases where a fine
exceeding three hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six
months was actually imposed, or where the constitutionality or
legality of a statute or penalty is attacked. 9 In other cases, the
only appeal from a municipal court judgment is to the district
court.40 In City of Shreveport v. Moore41 the defendant had been
convicted in the Shreveport City Court of reckless driving while
intoxicated, and sentenced to a fine of one hundred dollars and
thirty days in jail. An appeal, questioning the legality of the
penalty imposed, was taken to the district court. After a trial
de novo, the conviction was affirmed, and defense counsel sought
to appeal to the supreme court. The case met the supreme
court's general jurisdictional requirements, since the legality of
the penalty was challenged. However, the defendant had already
raised that issue in his appeal to the district court, and a further
appeal was refused. Where such a constitutional question is
involved, the defendant may appeal directly to the supreme
court or may raise the issue on appeal to the district court, but
he cannot raise it twice.
Justice LeBlanc suggests two limitations on the court's
37. La. Act 191 of 1948; La. R.S. (1950) 15:386.
38. This important double jeopardy aspect of the situation is discussed in
Note, 11 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 464, 467 (1951).
39. La. Const. of 1921, Art. VII, § 10.
40. Id. at Art. VII, § 36.
41. 53 So. 2d 783 (La. 1951), consolidated for argument and appeal with
City of Shreveport v. O'Daniel, 53 So. 2d 786 (La. 1951).
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ruling, which will eliminate the possibility of its operating
oppressively in deserving cases. First, while the defendant has
no right of further appeal upon the legality of the penalty, the
supreme court might in a sufficiently meritorious case, grant
review under its plenary supervisory jurisdiction. Second, if the
trial de novo in the appeal to the district court had been limited
to the question of defendant's guilt or innocence, the issue of
constitutionality of the penalty could have been presented in a
direct appeal to the supreme court. That would be a case of
concurrent appellate jurisdiction, upon separate and distinct
questions.
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Henry G. McMahon*
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Seven cases decided during the past term involved serious
questions concerning the jurisdiction ratione materiae of the
trial court. In two of these,' a closely-divided court held the
gambling abatement statute2 invalid because of an unconstitu-
tional grant of territorial jurisdiction. Both cases presented
appeals from judgments of the district court sustaining excep-
tions of no right and no cause of action to proceedings brought to
enjoin defendants from continued operation of their gambling
houses. These exceptions were leveled at the unconstitutionality
of the basic statute in permitting institution of abatement suits
in any district court of the state, regardless of the location of the
nuisance sought to be enjoined, in violation of Sections 31 and 81
of Article VII of the Constitution, and of the due process clause
of the Constitutions3 of the state and of the United States. The
chief justice, speaking for the majority of the court, accepted the
argument of the defendants in pronouncing the invalidity of the
basic statute. Two of the dissenting judges, Justices Hamiter
and Hawthorne, adhered to their original positions4 that the
* Dean and Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Law School.
1. Tanner v. Beverly Country Club; Ellzey v. Original Club Forest, 217
La. 1043, 47 So. 2d 905 (1950), noted in 25 Tulane L. Rev. 399 (1951).
2. La. Act 192 of 1920, as amended by La. Acts 49 of 1938 and 120 of 1940,
La. R.S. (1950) 13:4721 through 13:4727.
3. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2; U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
4. These cases were considered by the supreme court about eighteen
months before, when judgments of the trial court sustaining exceptions to
the jurisdiction were reversed. See Tanner v. Beverly Country Club; Ellzey
v. Original Club Forest, 214 La. 791, 38 So. 2d 783 (1948), discussed in The
Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term, 10 LouisIANA
LAW REVIEW 120, 237 (1950).
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